The Energy Shield: Forging the Laws for Energy Resilience in National Defense System

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In the era of contemporary threats marked by geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and global supply chain disruptions, defense and security can no longer be understood solely within the military domain. One strategic sector that has yet to be fully integrated into Indonesia’s defense system is energy. In fact, the national defense system, as mandated by Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense and Law No. 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for State Defense, is comprehensive in nature and involves all citizens, territories, and national resources. Energy, as a strategic resource, should be one of the pillars of national defense.

Energy plays a crucial role in ensuring the continuity of defense systems and military operations. The need for fuel to power combat vehicles, military aircraft, warships, as well as electricity to support military installations, cyber defense systems, radar, and communications, cannot be overlooked. Energy resilience is a fundamental requirement to ensure the sustainability of troop mobility, logistics, and command and control systems under all conditions. Without reliable and sustainable energy availability, the country’s combat and defense capabilities would be significantly weakened.

From a regulatory perspective, Law No. 23 of 2019 divides national defense into three components: the main component (the Indonesian National Armed Forces), the reserve component, and the supporting component. Depending on its usage context, energy can be categorized under the latter two components. This indicates that energy is not merely a civil need but also an integral part of national defense strategy. This aligns with the mandate of Article 33 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which asserts that natural resources contained in the land, waters, and airspace are controlled by the state and utilized to the greatest benefit of the people including in ensuring national security.

Global practice shows that major powers have implemented legal policies that explicitly integrate the energy and defense sectors. The United States, for instance, through 10 U.S. Code § 2911 (Energy Resilience Policy), mandates that every Department of Defense facility must have a resilient energy strategy that includes the use of renewable energy and robust backup systems. China, through the revision of its National Defense Law in 2020, allows the use of civilian energy infrastructure to support military operations during national emergencies. These two examples demonstrate how energy resilience has been explicitly recognized as part of national defense strategy and has been legally formulated to ensure its effectiveness.

In contrast, in Indonesia, the regulatory frameworks governing energy and defense still operate in parallel and have yet to be substantively integrated. Law No. 30 of 2007 on Energy and Law No. 30 of 2009 on Electricity do regulate the principles of national energy sovereignty and resilience, but they do not explicitly address aspects of national defense. Energy is positioned merely as a vital sector, not as a strategic component of the national defense system.

The absence of legal norms that explicitly unite these two sectors results in overlapping institutional authorities. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) tend to operate based on their respective sectoral mandates, without a legal platform that facilitates structural and operational collaboration. Coordination concerning the security of strategic energy infrastructure, fuel supply for defense equipment, or the development of renewable energy for military use remains ad hoc and lacks a permanent cross-sectoral policy framework.

Structurally, energy affairs within Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense currently fall under the Sub-directorate of Fuel, which is part of the Directorate of Facilities and Services (FASJAS), under the Directorate General of Defense Power. This structure reflects that energy management in defense is not yet treated as a matter of strategic policy, but rather remains a purely technical issue.

This is in stark contrast to practices in several developed countries, such as the United States. There, defense energy issues are handled directly by a specialized high-level body: the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy Resilience and Optimization (ER&O), which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This position carries a strategic mandate to ensure that the energy systems supporting U.S. military operations are resilient, efficient, and independent of civilian energy systems that are vulnerable to disruption. The existence of this dedicated office demonstrates that energy is viewed as an integral component of national defense doctrine and posture.

One example of policy disparity in Indonesia is the fact that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), despite being a major energy consumer for its operational needs, is still required to purchase fuel (BBM) at industrial prices. In contrast, the national police force benefits from subsidized fuel. This imbalance reflects a weak state recognition of energy as a critical component of the national defense system and highlights the absence of a dedicated scheme to secure military energy needs in a sustainable and equitable manner. In times of crisis such as war, sabotage, or large-scale natural disasters this condition may severely hinder national response efforts due to the lack of clear authority and an integrated command mechanism between energy and defense institutions.

To address this gap, there is a pressing need for a national legal framework that formally integrates energy resilience into Indonesia’s defense architecture. Such a framework would serve multiple urgent purposes. First, it would establish cross-sectoral coordination between ministries and institutions that currently operate in silos. Second, it would provide a legal foundation for safeguarding critical national energy infrastructure against threats such as cyberattacks or acts of sabotage during conflict. Third, it would allow the formation of a dedicated military energy unit tasked with developing and implementing energy strategies for defense purposes. Finally, it would enable the creation of legal incentives for energy industries that contribute to national security by supporting the development of a resilient and independent energy system.

To address these challenges, the government can begin by drafting a National Energy Resilience Bill or at least a Presidential Regulation that specifically addresses the integration of energy into the defense system. Energy must be positioned at the forefront of our defense system not merely as a resource but as a strategic component that is protected, managed, and optimized within the framework of national law.